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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
FRANCISCO A. CANDEDO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050899-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for one count of securities fraud, a second degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§61-1-1,-21 (West 2004), one count of sales by 
an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 61-1-3, -21 (West 2004), and one count of employing an unlicensed broker-dealer or 
agent, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-l-3(2)(a), -21 (West 
2004), in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Stephen L. 
Henriod presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issues: 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a 108-month term of 
probation when governing case law expressly authorizes an unlimited term? 
Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews the sentencing decision of the district 
court, including the decision to grant or deny probation, for abuse of discretion. See State v. 
Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432,f 14, 82 P.3d 1167. 
2. Whether a statutory authorization to impose a probationary term of 108 months 
violates substantive due process? 
Standard of Review: This issue was not preserved in the trial court and should not be 
reviewed. "While rule 22(e) allows a court to review an illegal sentence at any time, it must 
be 'narrowly circumscribed' to prevent abuse." Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, f^ 15, 84 P.3d 
854 (citation omitted). The exceptional circumstances doctrine is "reserv[ed] for the most 
unusual circumstances where our failure to consider an issue that was not properly preserved 
for appeal would have resulted in manifest injustice." Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, \ 23, 
94P.3dl86. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are attached in Addendum A: 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amendment XIV, § 1; 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, Article I, § 7; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-1 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-102, -202, -302 (West 2004); 
Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with four counts of securities fraud and one 
count of pattern of unlawful activity (racketeering), all second degree felonies. In the same 
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information, he was also charged with another count of securities fraud, one count of sales 
by an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent, and one count of employing an unlicensed broker-
dealer or agent, all third degree felonies. R7-16. 
On May 31, 2005, defendant pled guilty to one count of second-degree felony 
securities fraud, third-degree-felony sales by an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent, and third-
degree-felony employing an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent. R207-09, 219. Defendant 
agreed to pay full restitution, 2.3 million dollars. R219-20. In exchange, the State agreed 
to dismiss all remaining charges and to recommend probation. R219. 
The court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of one-to-fifteen years for 
securities fraud, and zero-to-five years on both the sales by an unlicensed broker conviction 
and the employing an unlicensed broker conviction. R244-45; 270:16-26, 34-35. The court 
suspended the prison terms on all three counts and sentenced defendant to serve 365 days in 
jail. R245. Instead of prison terms, the court ordered that "defendant is placed on probation 
for 108 month(s)." R270:35; R246. The court also ordered that defendant pay full restitution 
in an agreed amount or to be determining at a hearing. R270:35; R246. The court explained 
that "the most fair thing to do with [defendant] is to have him serve some time, and then to 
work for a long time paying as much money back as humanly possible." R270:34. 
On September 29, 2005, defendant timely appealed his sentence. R247. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Defendant pleaded guilty to the following offenses and admitted: 
Count 1 - Securities Fraud: 
That commencing on or about November 2000, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, in connection with the offer or sale of an investment, directly or 
indirectly, to Eric Utley and William May, as a party to the offense, I made 
untrue statements of a material fact or I omitted to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements I made, in the light of circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading; or, I engaged in an act, practice, 
or course of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon these persons. The value of the property, money or thing obtained 
exceeded $10,000, a violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21, a 
second degree felony. 
Count 6 - Sales by an Unlicensed Broker-Dealer or Agent: 
That commencing on or about June 2001, in the State of Utah, County of 
Salt Lake, as a party to the offense, I willfully engaged in the offer or sale of 
a security without being licensed to transact business in the State of Utah, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§61-1-3 and 61-1-21, a third degree felony. 
Count 7 - Employing an Unlicensed Broker-Dealer or Agent: 
That commencing on or about June 2001, in the State of Utah, County of 
Salt Lake, I willfully supervised an agent, Bonnie Kunz, when the agent was 
not licensed to transact business in the State of Utah, in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 61-l-3(2)(a) and 61-1-21, a third degree felony. 
R208-09. 
1
 The facts are taken from the Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea 
(R207-09, 219-20), the Affidavit of Probable Cause (R19-45), which defendant 
acknowledged as an accurate description of his criminal conduct and which he 
incorporated by reference into his plea statement (R209), the PSI (R265:l-20), and the 
sentencing hearing (R270:2-35). 
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Affidavit of Probable Cause1 
From June 2001 through June 2002, persons acting under defendant's and Nia Cano's 
direction, "directly or indirectly collected millions of dollars from hundreds of investors for 
and investment in MBU [Mutual Benefits Union Corporation] through ABC [Alternate 
Business Capital]." R23. 
Investors were told that MBU offered three levels of participation. R23. The first 
level, called the "Conservative Account," paid six percent to eighteen percent annually. Id. 
The second level, called the "Conservative/Aggressive Account," paid one percent to eleven 
percent per month. Id. Investors in these two accounts were told that their principal and the 
return were "100% guaranteed." R23-24. The third level, called the "Aggressive Account," 
paid 100 percent to 300 percent per year; however, this program was not guaranteed. R24. 
The investments were represented to be passive and the only role of the investor was to 
supply capital for the program. Id. The Utah Division of Securities deemed MBU's 
offerings to be securities which were not exempt from registration. Id. 
A salesperson of Pro Fin, another company organized to conduct "processing for 
ABC" and "member services for ABC and MBU," told Lt. Witney that salespersons were 
"supervised and controlled by [defendant]," and that "before the sales group was put 
together, Cano and [defendant] gave all of the presentations to investors." R25. In April 
2
 Lt. Doug Witney, of the Utah County Attorney's Office, investigated the case 
and authored the Affidavit of Probable Cause. R20, 45. 
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2002, after a search warrant had been executed at the office of ABC in Sandy, Utah, "MBU 
removed all files and computers from Pro Fin's California office and changed their name[.]" 
R24-26. As early as December of 2001, investors were demanding funds from MBU, but 
were unable to recover their investments. R26. By January 2003, the corporate status of 
MBU, a Nevada corporation, was "delinquent, inactive and revoked." R21. 
Count 1 - In November 2000, Eric Utley and Will May paid $635 to become 
members in ABC. R26. During 2001, Utley and May had approximately three discussions 
with both Cano and defendant about the investment. R27. From November 2001 through 
June 2002, Utley and May invested over $389,000 in MBU, plus an additional ten percent 
for insurance on the investment. Id. When they tried to withdraw $84,236 of their 
investment by submitting the "proper" forms, defendant and/or Cano repeatedly gave them 
"reasons" why they were not receiving their funds. Id. In connection with the offer and sale 
of the investment, defendant and Cano, directly or indirectly, made multiple material 
misrepresentations and omissions. R27-29. 
Counts 6 and 7 - Defendant and Cano had never been licensed to sell securities in 
Utah and they engaged others to sell securities who had never been so licensed. R42. 
Presentence Investigation Report 
The PSI stated that the MBU/ABC investment businesses constituted a "pyramid 
scheme" by which defendant "defraud[ed]" over a hundred Utah victims out of millions of 
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dollars. R265:2. Defendant continued to do business even after lawsuits were filed and a 
Utah cease and desist order and California injunctions were issued. R265:3. 
Although defendant maintained that he was merely "a lower-level manager," of ABC, 
statements of the victims placed him on a level with the business founder, Nia Cano, both in 
the promotion of the schemes and his contacts with investors. R265:2, 8,10,12-14,19. The 
PSI noted that defendant's claim that he did not know the business founder was "bilking the 
investors," or that the company was a pyramid scheme, "simply does not ring true." Id. 
Rather, "it appeared to the victims [that defendant] was acting more as a partner than a 
salaried employee." R265:3. 
The PSI also indicated that defendant did not act cooperatively with investors or law 
enforcement. One victim reported that if anyone complained to defendant regarding monies 
not received, defendant would warn him that it was a privilege to be a member, and if they 
continued to complain he would put their money in an account which they could not access 
for six months and they would no longer be a member of ABC. R265:14. Defendant told 
one of his salespeople not to cooperate with law enforcement when they executed a search 
warrant at ABC's offices in Sandy, Utah. R24; 265:5. 
Defendant's fraudulent actions devastated many of his victims. R265:13-17. Some 
lost retirements funds. R265:3 Others lost their homes and properties. Id. Still others lost 
their businesses and their credit ratings. Id. Several, elderly or ill, lost their ability to live 
independently and became dependent on family members to support them. Id. One victim 
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attempted suicide. Id. Other victims' marriages and relationships with family members and 
friends whom they "brought into" the investment scheme have been jeopardized. Id. 
Another victim lost 1.1 million dollars, the majority of which he also gave directly to 
defendant. R265:13. According to that victim, defendant's fraudulent actions left him 
unemployed, bankrupt, and so severely depressed that he had attempted suicide. Id. Yet 
another victim, a 70-year-old woman with cancer, lost her home. R265:16. 
Defendant expressed little empathy for his victims: "[Defendant] has stated that he 
deeply regrets his 'part in the financial loss of the ABC members,' but that is the extent of 
expressed concern for the victims in this case. R265:3. The LSI (Level of Service 
Inventory), an assessment tool designed to assess and prioritize offender needs, revealed one 
of defendant's greatest needs involved "attitude/orientation." R265:2. The PSI stated: 
"[This] area reflects [defendant's minimization of his role in ABC and related businesses, 
his failure to accept his measure of responsibility for the victimization of the investors he 
recruited into the 'program' and perceived lack of victim empathy." Id. 
The Utah Attorney General's Office compiled a list of 146 victims. R265:12; see 
Victim Restitution List, atR265. Thatoffice computed restitution to be$3,373,060. R265:3. 
AP&P recommended that defendant be incarcerated at the Utah State Prison for the terms 
prescribed by law on each count, pay restitution, and surrender his passport. R265:l-2. 
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Sentencing 
The sentencing hearing was held on September 12,2005. R270:1. After hearing from 
defense counsel and the prosecutor, the court heard from Utah victims and their 
representatives. R270:2-l. Their testimony corroborated the PSFs assessment of 
defendant's lack of empathy and cooperation. R265:2, 17-2515, 18. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion because Utah Code Ann. 77-
18-l(10(a)(i) (West 2004), does not authorize the imposition of consecutive terms of 
probation. The claim, however, is based on a faulty premise. The court did not impose 
consecutive terms of probation. Rather, it imposed a single 108-month term of probation. 
While the written order is not without some ambiguity, the language of the order as a whole 
and the court's expressed intention to place defendant on a very lengthy, uninterrupted period 
of probation to repay victims a large sum of money are clear. The supreme court recently 
held that section 77-18-1 "does not impose any limitation on the length of a probationary 
term that a court may impose." Statev. Wallace, 2006 UT86,Tf 13,150P.3d540. Thus, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 108-month term in this case. 
Alternatively, even if the order were read as imposing three consecutive thirty-six-
month terms of probation, as argued by defendant, he would not be entitled to the remedy he 
seeks: imposition of concurrent terms of probation, resulting in a total probation term of 
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thirty six months. Assuming arguendo that imposition of consecutive terms of probation 
were illegal, a position at odds with Wallace, the proper remedy is not imposition of the most 
minimum sentence, but remand for imposition of a legal sentence. On remand and pursuant 
to Wallace, the trial court may then legally impose a single term of 108 months. 
Moreover, the Court should not consider defendant's claim, that a consecutive term 
of probation is illegal, because it was not preserved. To preserve an issue for appeal, an 
objection must be specific. At no time did defendant put the court on notice that his concern 
about the 108-month probation was related to its being imposed as consecutive terms. Nor 
should the Court consider defendant's claim under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Defendant cites no authority to support his contention that a lesser term of 108-
months is illegal simply because it is imposed in segments rather than as a single term. And 
in any case, the remedy it the sentence is illegal is not imposition ot the most minimum 
sentence, but rather the imposition of a legal sentence comprising a single term. 
POINT II 
Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i), as 
interpreted by Wallace, violates substantive due process because, by providing for the 
imposition of an unlimited term of probation, it is not rationally related to rehabilitation, the 
principal object of probation. The Court should not consider defendant's substantive due 
process claim. Following Wallace, a challenge to the length of defendant's term of probation 
is not properly reviewable under rule 22(e). Nor do the circumstances of the case justify 
10 
review under the exceptional circumstances doctrine. That doctrine is applied only to rare 
procedural anomalies. Contrary to defendant's argument, the issuance of Wallace after 
defendant's case was on appeal would not have provided a better opportunity for defendant 
to make a substantive due process argument at sentencing than if it had issued before. 
In any case, substantive due process requires that even before considering whether a 
statute is rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose, the claimant must at least show 
that the challenged statute implicates a fundamental right or liberty interest. Defendant has 
not made any effort to show that section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i), as interpreted by Wallace, 
implicates a fundamental right or liberty interest. He cannot demonstrate that implication 
because it is well-established that he has no right to probation or any alleged effective mode 
of rehabilitation related to probation. 
Moreover, the statutory authorization to impose an unlimited period of probation is 
rationally related to the express probationary goal of restitution and rehabilitation. Section 
77-18-1 incorporates the Crime Victims Restitution Act ("Act"). The Act implies that the 
court may impose conditions on a probationer necessary to pay full restitution. It also directs 
the sentencing court to consider the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution. In many cases, like this one, a defendant ordered to pay full restitution cannot be 
expected to fulfill his obligation unless the period of probation is substantial. Thus, the 
provisions of section 77-18-1 and of the Act support the statutory authorization to impose an 
extended period of restitution, consistent with the goal of rehabilitation. Further, this Court 
11 
has recognized that punishment, as well as rehabilitation, are legitimate goals of restitution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO A 108-MONTH PROBATIONARY 
TERM BECAUSE, UNDER STATE V. WALLACE, "THE 
LEGISLATURE HAS NOT LIMITED TERMS OF PROBATION TO 
ANY PARTICULAR TIME PERIOD;" MOREOVER, THE ISSUE OF 
CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF PROBATION WAS NOT PRESERVED 
AND THE SENTENCE MAY NOT BE REVIEWED AS ILLEGAL, 
FOLLOWING WALLACE 
An appellate court reviews the sentencing decision of the district court, including the 
decision to grant or deny probation, for abuse of discretion. See State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT 
App 432,^ [ 14, 82 P.3d 1167. "An abuse of discretion results when the judge fails to consider 
all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed is clearly excessive." Id. (quotations 
and citation omitted). Furthermore, "[a]n appellate court may only find etbuse if it can be said 
that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court." Id. (quotations 
and citation omitted). 
Here, defendant first claims that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him 
to three consecutive 36-month terms of probation. Aplt. Br. at 10-18. The essence of his 
argument is that Utah's sentencing and probation statutes do not authorize the imposition of 
consecutive terms of probation, based on their construction and legislative policy designed 
12 
to rehabilitate an offender, rather than punish him with a lengthy term of probation.3 See 
Aplt. Br. at 13-18. 
Defendant's claim it is based on a faulty premise. The trial court did not impose three 
consecutive 36-month terms of probation. Rather, it imposed a single 108-month term of 
probation. R246; 270:35. InStatev. Wallace, 2006 UT86,150 P.3d540, the Utah Supreme 
Court concluded that UTAH CODE ANN. 77-18-1 (West 2004) "does not limit[] terms of 
probation to any particular time period." See id. at \ 4. 
Even if the Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment is read to impose three consecutive 
thirty-six-month terms of probation, the imposition is consistent with Wallace's 
interpretation, that section 77-18-1 "does not impose any limitation on the length of a 
3
 Specifically, defendant argument is as follows: UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-
201(2)(c-d) (West 2004) identifies probation and imprisonment as two separate 
sentencing options. Aplt. Br. at 13. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (West 2004), providing 
for probation does not provide for the imposition of consecutive terms of probation. Aplt. 
Br. at 13. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401 (West 2004), which provides for sentences of 
imprisonment, by contrast, does expressly provide for consecutive terms of imprisonment. 
Aplt. Br. at 13-14. This statutory distinction means that the Legislature did not intend 
section 77-18-1 to authorize the imposition of consecutive terms of probation. Aplt. Br. 
at 14. This conclusion is consistent with federal and Utah authority that recognize that 
consecutive terms of probation do not foster the rehabilitative purpose of probation. Aplt. 
Br. at 15-16. Thus "the probation statute authorizes a single probationary period that can 
later be modified, extended or revoked, but only it the defendant gives society a reason to 
distrust him by failing to abide by the terms of his probation." Aplt. Br. at 17. The grant 
of this limited authority is further bolstered by section 77-18-1's express authorization to 
the court to place defendant on bench probation to enforce restitution. Aplt. Br. at 17. 
Finally, he argues that consecutive terms of probation create a confusing and unfair 
mechanism of administration. Aplt. Br. at 17-18. In sum, the trial court acted beyond its 
statutory authority in imposing consecutive terms of probation. Aplt. Br. at 18. 
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probationary term that a court may impose." State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, f 13. Moreover, 
the Court should not consider the merits of defendant's claim because it was not preserved 
and, following Wallace, does not involve an illegal sentence under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. And in any case, the remedy if the sentence is illegal is not imposition 
of the most minimum sentence, but rather the imposition of a legal sentenced comprised of 
a single term. 
A. Defendant's claim is based on the faulty premise that the 
trial court imposed three consecutive 36-month terms of probation. 
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court suspended defendant's concurrent prison 
sentences, and placed defendant on probation for 108 months: 
The Court: I'm going to suspend prison . . . . 
He is ordered to pay full restitution jointly and severally.... 
Surrender the passports. All the normal conditions of probation, 
which will be for 108 months. That's 36 months on each of the counts. That's 
nine years because the amount of money that you've got to pay back. 
. . . Any questions? 
Defense Counsel [Mr. Bugden]: Your Honor, may I just politely inquire, do 
you have a power to - -
Trial Court: I can give 36 months on each of three felonies that he's convicted of. 
Defense Counsel: Okay. 
The Court: All right. Thank you. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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R270:35 (Addendum B). 
The Judgment, Sentence and Commitment states, in pertinent part: 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 108 month(s).. . . 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Defendant is sentenced to 36 months on each count. 
R246 (Addendum C). 
The most reasonable reading of the proceedings and the sentencing order is that the 
court placed defendant on probation for a single term of 108 months. That is the court's first 
expression and evident intent both at sentencing and in the order. Defendant apparently 
assumes that because the court ordered "36 months on each count," the total of 108 months 
of probation constitutes three consecutive 36-month-terms (3 x 36 = 108). However, 
nowhere does the court indicate that it imposed consecutive terms. Rather, the court 
evidently aggregated three 36-month periods into a single probationary term. Moreover, this 
reading is more consistent with the court's obvious intention to impress defendant that 
probation had been imposed to help ensure repayment of victims of at least a significant 
portion of at least $2.3 million, which would necessarily take a long time. R219-20; 270:35. 
Stated differently, the court gave defendant no reason to believe that the substantial and 
necessarily lengthy task of repayment was in any sense divisible into, or could be 
accomplished in, 36-month segments, as consecutive terms expressly denote. In short, 
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because the court placed defendant on probation for a single 108-month term, rather than 
three consecutive 36-month terms, the Court need not consider defendant's argument that 
section 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i) does not authorize the imposition of consecutive terms. However, 
following Wallace, the outcome of this case should be the same, regardless of whether the 
court imposed a single term or multiple consecutive terms. 
B. State v. Wallace permits a probationary term of 108 months. 
Wallace was convicted of multiple felonies related to his participation in a fraudulent 
investment scheme. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, fflf 1, 2. The trial court suspended the six prison 
terms it imposed and placed Wallace on probation for 144 months (twelve years). Id. The 
trial court set an extended period of probation specifically for the purpose of giving Wallace 
'as long an opportunity as possible to make restitution payments.'"Id. at f^ 3. 
On direct appeal, this Court rejected Wallace's claim that section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) 
limits probation to no more than thirty-six months for one or more felony convictions and 
that his 144-month probation constituted an illegal sentence. State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App 
434, Tflf 17-19. On certiorari review, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the same claim, 
holding that the statutory words were "clear," see id. at *[  9, and that "the provision does not 
impose any limitation on the length of a probationary term." Wallace, 2006 UT 86, ^  6,13. 
Consequently, because it could find "no other provision that limits the term of probation," 
the court concluded "that our law currently provides no statutory limitation on the length of 
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probation a trial court may impose." Id. at 14. And therefore, the court held, "Wallace's 
twelve-year probation does not constitute an illegal sentence." Id. at f 15. 
The Wallace court implicitly recognized that its holding effectively also reached 
consecutive terms of probation. The court granted certiorari on two issues: "whether section 
77-18-1(10)(a)(i) creates a thirty-six-month limitation for a term of probation as to any felony 
conviction; and whether terms of probation for multiple convictions may be imposed 
consecutively." The court concluded, however, that it "need not and do not reach the second 
issue." Id. at f 4. Essentially, the court implicitly recognized that its affirmative answer to 
the first question nullified the second question. This conclusion is supported by the court's 
expressed reason: It need not and would not address the question of consecutive terms of 
probation "[b]ecause we conclude that the Legislature has not limited terms of probation to 
any particular time period." Id. 
Alternatively, even if the order were read as imposing three consecutive thirty-six-
month terms of probation, as argued by defendant, see Aplt. Br. at 9, 18, he would not be 
entitled to the remedy he seeks: imposition of concurrent terms of probation, resulting in a 
total probation term of thirty six months. Assuming arguendo that imposition of consecutive 
terms of probation were illegal, a position at odds with Wallace, the proper remedy is not 
imposition of the most minimum sentence, but remand for imposition of a legal sentence. 
On remand and pursuant to Wallace, the trial court may then legally impose a single term of 
108 months. 
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In sum, "[b]ecause the Legislature has not limited terms of probal ion to any particular 
time period," see Wallace, 2006 UT 86, ^ 4, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
placing defendant on a 108-month term of probation. 
C. Defendant's claim should not be considered on the merits because 
it was not preserved and, in light of Wallace, does not deserve 
consideration under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court should decline to consider defendant's 
claim—that Utah's sentencing and probation statutes do not authorize the imposition of 
consecutive terms of probation—because, contrary to his assertion, see Aplt. Br. at 24-25, 
it was not preserved in the trial court. 
"Under ordinary circumstances, we will not consider an issue brought for the first time 
on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or exceptional circumstances exist." 
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, % 16, 94 P.3d 186. "[I]n order to preserve a 
contention of error in the admission of evidence for appeal, a defendanl must raise a timely 
objection to the trial court in clear and specific terms." State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79, 
\ 13, 67 P.3d 1005 (quoting State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 495 (Utah Ct. App.1992) 
(alteration in original), affd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993)). "Importantly, the grounds for the 
objection must be distinctly and specifically stated." Id. (quoting State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 
627, 633 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "Where there [is] no clear or specific objection . . . and the 
specific ground for objection [is] not clear from the context... the theory cannot be raised 
on appeal." Id. (quoting Larsen, 828 P.2d at 495 (alterations in original)). See e.g. id. 
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(holding objection on "relevancy" insufficient to preserve claim on appeal that detective's 
testimony was inadmissible under rules 408 and 410, rules of evidence precluding evidence 
taken from offers to compromise and plea negotiations, respectively); State v. Eldredge, 113 
P.2d 29, 35-36 (refusing to consider on appeal claim that victim's testimony was unreliable 
based only on an objection as to competency); State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215,1222 (Utah 
1986) ("Where there was no clear or specific objection on the basis of character evidence or 
unfair prejudice and the specific ground for objection was not clear from the context of the 
question or the testimony, the theory cannot be raised on appeal.") "Moreover, it is well 
settled that a defendant who objects to the admission of evidence has the burden to 'make 
certain that the record [he] compile[s] will adequately preserve [his] arguments for review. 
. . . One who fails to make a necessary objection or who fails to insure that it is on the record 
is deemed to have waived the issue.'" Smedley, 2003 UT App 79, ^ 13 (quoting State v. 
Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 537 (Utah Ct. App.1998)). 
The State does not dispute that the trial court's response to defendant's inquiry 
preserved for appeal the question of the court's authority to impose a 108-month term of 
probation. Cf. State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991) (admissibility of 
evidence preserved for appeal where trial judge chose not to find defendant had waived 
isuue, but instead considered claim on merits). But defendant does not challenge the 
imposition of a single 108-month term. Instead, defendant claim that though a 108-month 
term is legal, three 36-month terms imposed consecutively is not. This issue was not raised 
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below. As set out above, defendant's inquiry to the trial court was evidently motivated by 
the court's imposition of the 108-month probationary term. R270:35. At no point did 
defendant "distinctly and specifically" obj ect that the probationary term imposed by the court 
was unlawful because it was composed of consecutive terms. See Smedley, 2003 UT App 
79, f 13. The Court should hold that defendant failed to preserve his con secutive-term claim 
and, therefore, decline to consider it. 
The Court should also refuse to consider defendant's consecutive-term claim under 
rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Aplt. Br. at 25. That rule provides: "The 
court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner at any 
time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). "While rule 22(e) allows a court to review an illegal sentence 
at any time, it must be 'narrowly circumscribed' to prevent abuse." Thorkelson, 2004 UT 
App9,TJ15, 84P.3d854 (citing State v. Telford, 2002 UT 5 \,\ 5,48 P.3d 228). "The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that a rule 22(e) illegal sentence is a 'patently' illegal sentence, State 
v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995), or a 'manifestly' illegal sentence, Telford, 2002 
UT 51 at \ 5,48 P.3d 228. Id. "A 'patently' or 'manifestly' illegal sentence generally occurs 
in one of two situations: (1) where the sentencing court has no jurisdiction, or (2) where the 
sentence is beyond the authorized statutoiy range." Id. (citation omitted). 
Defendant does not claim that the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction. Nor, following 
the supreme court's opinion in Wallace, can defendant seriously contend that his 108-month 
term of probation was a "sentence [] beyond the authorized statutory range." On facts almost 
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indistinguishable from this case, the supreme court stated that "Wallace's twelve-year 
probation does not constitute an illegal sentence." Wallace, 2006 UT 86, f 16. In sum, the 
Court should hold that the trial court did not impose an illegal sentence and decline to 
consider the merits of his claim under rule 22(e). 
POINT II 
REVIEW OF DEFENDANT'S SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIM 
UNDER RULE 22(E) OR THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
DOCTRINE IS UNJUSTIFIED IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 
CASE; IN ANY CASE, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS IS 
INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS NOT 
IDENTIFIED A VIOLATION OF ANY ENTITLEMENT 
IMPLICATING A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT; IN ANY EVENT, THE 
EXTENDED PERIOD OF PROBATION PROVIDED BY SECTION 77-
18-1 RATIONALLY RELATES TO DEFENDANT'S FULFILLING HIS 
OBLIGATION TO MAKE FULL RESTITUTION TO VICTIMS 
Alternatively, defendant claims that even if the 108-month term of probation is a 
single term, the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of section 77-18-1 in Wallace deprives 
him of substantive due process. Aplt. Br. at 19-20. He argues that that interpretation, which 
authorizes a trial court to impose a probationary term of any length, is not rationally related 
to the rehabilitative goal of probation, which, he asserts, is undermined by the imposition of 
a lengthy term of probation. Aplt. Br. at 21, 24. Defendant's claim does not merit 
consideration under substantive due process analysis, rule 22(e), or exceptional 
circumstances. 
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A. Defendant's claim should not be considered on the merits because 
it is not subject to review under rule 22(e), and does not 
warrant review under the rubric of "exceptional circumstances." 
Defendant acknowledges that his substantive due process claim is raised for the first 
time on appeal. Aplt. Br. at 26. Consequently, he argues that the Court should consider it 
under rule 22(e), as an illegal sentence. Aplt. Br. at 27-28. The claim, however, is not 
subject to review under rule 22(e), and therefore the Court should decline to review it on that 
basis. 
As set out above, an illegal sentence is a "patently" or "manifestly" illegal sentence, 
which, in the circumstances of this case, can only be one that is beyond the authorized 
sentencing range. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79, •([ 13 (citations omitted). Defendant's claim 
fails to make this showing. After Wallace, a sentence imposing a 108-month term of 
probation is not patently or manifestly illegal. 
Alternatively, defendant also argues that his claim should be reviewed because 
"exceptional or extraordinary circumstances exist." Aplt. Br. at 26. Defendant's resort to 
the doctrine of exceptional circumstances is misplaced. 
"[Exceptional circumstances' is a concept that is used sparingly, properly reserved 
for truly exceptional situations, for cases . . . involving 'rare procedural anomalies." State 
v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah Ct. App.1996) (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 
n. 3 (Utah 1993)). The exceptional circumstances doctrine is "reserv[ed] for the most unusual 
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circumstances where our failure to consider an issue that was not properly preserved for 
appeal would have resulted in manifest injustice." Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, f 23. 
Defendant correctly states that the supreme court's decision in Wallace had not issued 
until after defendant's case was on appeal. Aplt. Br. at 26.4 Therefore, he argues that '"at 
the time of his sentencing,5 [he] 'had no particular need to' argue the probation statute 
violated substantive due process because it had not yet been interpreted to impose no 
'limitation on the length of probation a trial court may impose.'" Aplt. Br. at 27 (citing State 
v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In other words, defendant claims that he had no 
notice to object on the grounds of due process until Wallace issued. In support, defendant 
cites State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) to argue that this circumstance established 
exceptional circumstances to review his due process claim. Defendant is mistaken. 
In Lopez, the defendant moved to suppress evidence found in a traffic stop. 873 P.2d 
at 1130. Lopez argued that the stop was a pretext, relying only on the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. Id. at 1130, 1134 n.2. The trial court granted defendant's 
motion, and this Court upheld that ruling on interlocutory appeal. Id. at 1129-30. The State 
sought certiorari challenging the Fourth Amendment pretext doctrine. Id. at 1134 n.2. Lopez 
cross-petitioned, claiming that if the Fourth Amendment did not outlaw a pretext stop, than 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution should. Id. at 1127,1134 n.2. On certiorari, the 
4
 This Court's decision in this case, State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, issued 
more than 30 days after the date of defendant's sentencing, September 12, 2005. R270:l. 
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supreme court rej ected pretext analysis under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1140. However, 
it considered Lopez's alternative state constitutional challenge, raised for the first time on 
review, under the rubric of exceptional circumstances. Id. The supreme court reasoned that, 
having prevailed in the trial court and before this Court under the Fourth Amendment, Lopez 
had no reason earlier to know that the Fourth Amendment underpinnings of pretext doctrine 
would be attacked and thereby invoke a state constitutional claim. Id. at 1134 n.2. 
Here, by contrast, the subsequent issuance of Wallace does not provide defendant with 
any constitutional argument that he could not have asserted at the time sentence was 
imposed. Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that any term of probation, whether 
single or consecutive, is unconstitutional if it exceeds thirty-six months. Aplt. Br. at Pt.I. 
However, grounds for this argument were available at the time defendant was sentenced to 
a term of 108-months. Indeed, all of the authority defendant cites now on appeal existed at 
the time of sentencing, September 12, 2005. R270:l. See Aplt. Br. at 27 (citing State v. 
McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, % 19, 110P.3d 149 (issued February 25, 2005), cert denied, 
124 P.3d 251 (2005) and State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), both 
presuming that section 77-18-1(10(a)(i) provided only for a single term of probation not 
exceeding thirty-six months). Contrary to defendant's argument, Wallace, by holding that 
section 77-18-1(10(a)(i) does not limit a term of probation, if anything suggests a dimunition 
of defendant's constitutional argument. The issuance of Wallace simply does not explain 
why he could not have raised this claim in the trial court when he partially questioned the 
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trial court's authority to impose the 108 months' probation. R270:35. See State v. Lopez, 
886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994) (refusing to find exceptional circumstances to review state 
due process claim that was unavailable at time of trial because governing case had not then 
issued). If defendant really believed that the probationary term violated his substantive due 
process rights, he should have said, "Your Honor, you don't have the authority to impose 108 
months and even if you did, it violates substantive due process to do so." In sum, the court 
should conclude that no exceptional circumstances justify review of defendant's due process 
claim and, therefore, decline to consider it. 
B. Defendant has not asserted any fundamental right 
that justifies substantive due process analysis. 
"A statute is presumed constitutional, and [the reviewing court] resolve[s] any 
reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality. State v. Mattinson, 2007 UT 7, % 6, 152 P.3d 
300. 
Defendant does not claim that the imposition of a term of probation, single or 
consecutive, in excess of thirty-six months is itself a deprivation of a fundamental right. 
Aplt. Br. at 19. Rather, he claims that such a term violates substantive due process because 
it is not rationally related to the rehabilitative goal of probation, which, he asserts, is 
undermined by the imposition of consecutive terms of probation. Aplt. Br. at 21, 24. 
However, not only is there is no fundamental right to probation, but the imposition of a term 
of probation does not even implicate a fundamental right. And defendant has no other 
fundamental right at issue in connection with his sentencing. 
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The federal Due Process Clause states: "No State shall... deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law." Similarly, Utah's Due Process Clause 
states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." 
In Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), a case considering a due process 
challenge to a state ban on physician-assisted suicide, the Supreme Court explained its 
cautious approach to substantive due process analysis. Id. at 719-22. First, it set out the 
scope of entitlements protected by substantive due process: "The Due Process Clause 
guarantees more than fair process, and the" liberty' it protects includes more than the absence 
of physical restraint. Id. at 719-20 (citations omitted). "The Clause also provides heightened 
protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty 
interests." Id. at 720 (citations omitted). "[I]n addition to the specific freedoms protected 
by the Bill of Rights," the Supreme Court has specified only a limited number of fundamental 
rights and liberties that are "specially protected by the Due Process Clause": "the right to 
marry," "to have children," "to direct the education and upbringing of one's children," "to 
marital privacy," "to use contraception," "to bodily integrity," "and to abortion." Id. (also 
acknowledging the Court's "assumption] and strong suggestion], that the Due Process 
Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment") 
(citations omitted). 
The Court then explained its caution in expanding the scope of substantive due 
process and the threshold requirement for its application: 
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But we "ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of 
substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in 
this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.". . . 
Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two 
primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process 
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, 
objectively, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," . . . and 
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if they were sacrificed" . . . Second, we have required in 
substantive-due-process cases a llcareful description" of the asserted 
fundamental liberty interest. . . . Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and 
practices thus provide the crucial "guideposts for responsible decisionmaking," 
. . . that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause.... 
. . . In our view, . . . the development of this Court's substantive-due-process 
jurisprudence, described briefly supra, . . . has been a process whereby the 
outlines of the 'liberty' specially protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment—never fully clarified, to be sure, and perhaps not capable of 
being fully clarified—have at least been carefully refined by concrete 
examples involving fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal 
tradition. . . . In addition, by establishing a threshold requirement—that a 
challenged state action implicate a fundamental right-before requiring more 
than a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to justify the action, it 
avoids the need for complex balancing of competing interests in every case. 
Id. at 720-22 (citations omitted) (brackets in original and emphasis added). 
The Court concluded that neither suicide nor the assistance of physicians in aid of 
suicide was "a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 728. 
Only after distinguishing the arguably analogous liberty interests found in Cruzan v. 
Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (right to refuse lifesaving hydration and 
nutrition) and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (right 
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to abortion), however, did the Court proceed to a rational basis analysis. Id. at 723-35 
(concluding physician-assisted ban was rationally related to legitimate government interests). 
Here, defendant fails to articulate a basis for substantive due process analysis. 
Defendant claims that section "77-18-l(10)(a)(i), violates substantive due process because 
it does not rationally further the Legislature's stated legitimate interest in rehabilitating 
offenders.55 Aplt. Br. at 24. Under Glucksberg, however, defendant must make the 
"threshold"showing—that the authorization under section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) to impose an 
extended term of probation—at least implicates a fundamental right before arguing that the 
statute has no reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest. See id. 521 U.S. at 722.5 
Defendant cannot make this showing because a "defendant has no constitutional rights to be 
placed on probation " Beal v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 418, 421, 454 P.2d 624, 626 (Utah 
1969); State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 205, 310 P.2d 388,393 (1957) (same); United States 
v. Belgard, 894 F.2d 1092, 1100 -1101 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 860 (1990) (same). 
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-1(10) (West 2004) ("'Probation' is an act of grace by the 
court.. . .") Accordingly, defendant has no right to a time-limited probation that assertedly 
5
 Defendant's legal authorities accord with Glucksberg. See Aplt. Br. at 19. He 
cites State v. Martinez, 2000 UT App 320, 14 P.3d 114, affd 52 P.3d 1276, for the 
proposition: "To satisfy substantive due process, a statute must rationally further a 
legitimate governmental interest." Id. at If 24. However, Martinez's challenge to the 
mental element of the offense clearly implicated a liberty interest. Id. at % 6. See also 
Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist, 2005 UT 30, ffif 28-30, 116 P.3d 295 (reviewing 
claim that damage caps that implicated open courts clause); Juddv. Dreza, 2004 UT 91, 
HI 30-31, 103 P.3d 135 (same). 
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rehabilitates him more effectively than a longer period of probation. Defendant's sole 
argument is that the statutory authorization to impose a lengthy period of probation 
undermines rehabilitation by reinforcing a probationer's distrust in society. Aplt. Br. at 20-
21. That claim does not implicate any arguable fundamental right. In sum, the Court should 
not even entertain defendant's substantive due process claim. In any event, even applying 
substantive due process analysis, the authority to impose an unlimited term of probation is 
rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest in ensuring substantial restitution 
is paid to victims. 
C. The plain language of the probation statute authorize a trial court 
to impose appropriate conditions on a probationer to ensure the full 
payment of restitution in the context of the probation's rehabilitation, 
"To satisfy substantive due process, a statute must rationally further a legitimate 
governmental interest." Martinez, 2000 UT App 320 at ^ 24. 
One of the goals of probation is to enable a probationer to fulfill his obligation to 
make full restitution to crime victims. Often, a probationer will require a lengthy period of 
time to fulfill that obligation. The authority of a trial court under the statute to impose a 
lengthy or unlimited period of probation is thus rationally related to the legitimate 
governmental interest in assisting a probationer to fulfill his obligation and to help ensure 
that victims are made whole. 
Section 77-18-1 expresses this legitimate legislative intent. Subsection (8)(ix) 
provides that "[w]hile on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require 
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that the defendant... make restitution... to the . . . victims with interest in accordance with 
Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act[.]" UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (8)(ix). 
The Crime Victims Restitution Act ("Act") is directed to the mechanism of ensuring that 
restitution is paid to the victim.6 It contemplates the imposition of long-term probation to 
enable a probationer to fulfill his restitution obligation. "'Complete restitution' means 
restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant." Section 
77-38a-302(2)(a). "'Court-ordered restitution' means the restitution the court having 
criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time 
of sentencing." Section 77-38a-302(2)(b).7 "In determining the monetary sum and other 
conditions for court-ordered restitution, the court shall consider... (i) the financial resources 
of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the 
other obligations of the defendant." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) (West 2004) 
6
 The Crime Victims Restitution Act states: "'Restitution' meams full, partial, or 
nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim . . . . " UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-3 8a-
102(11) (West 2004). "At the time of. . . entry of any plea disposition of a felony . . . the 
attorney general. . . shall provide to the district court. . . the names of all victims . . . 
asserting claims to restitution." Section 77-38a-202(l)(a). "When a defendant is 
convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages . . . the court shall 
order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime . . . ." Section 77-3 8a-
302(1). 
7
 Section 77-38a-302 was amended in 2005. Current subsection (2)(b) further 
provides that "court-ordered restitution" also includes restitution ordered "within one year 
after sentencing." 2005 Laws, c. 96, § 5, effective May 2, 2005. In this case, the trial 
court ordered that if a restitution amount was not agreed on within 180 days, the court 
would set a hearing. R246. 
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(emphasis added). "Other conditions" reasonably suggests an extended period of probation 
to accomplish a burdensome restitutionary obligation. 
Moreover, the Legislature has expressly stated that payment of restitution is consistent 
with a probationer's rehabilitation. Among other factors the court must consider in imposing 
court-ordered restitution is "the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution . . . ." Section 77-38a-302(5)(c)(iii). In many cases, like this one, a defendant 
ordered to pay foil restitution cannot be expected to fulfill his obligation unless the period 
of probation is substantial. Thus, sections 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) and 77-38a-302(5)(c), taken 
together, support the statutory authorization to impose an extended period of restitution, 
consistent with the goal of rehabilitation. Other jurisdictions have recognized the same 
relationship. Miller v. State, 502 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ind.1986) "Restitution, as a condition of 
probation, can be an instrumental part of the offender's rehabilitation."); Com. v. Erb, 428 
A.2d 574, 582 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) ("Restitution can aid an offender's rehabilitation by 
strengthening the individual's sense of responsibility.") (citation omitted). 
Further, defendant's insistence that only a limited period of probation serves the goal 
of rehabilitation, see Aplt. Br. at 20-24, does not persuasively exclude other rational theories 
for a successful probation, at least in cases where the object of probation is restitution. In 
State v. Dadiego, 617 A.2d 5 52 (Me. 1992), the Maine Supreme Court upheld the imposition 
of consecutive terms of probation, totaling eight years, following defendant's plea to four 
counts of theft by deception. Id. at 553-55. The court approved the lower court's 
31 
characterization of the offenses as "'unusually serious' in terms of the duration of the 
criminal conduct and the amount of money taken." Id. at 554. It stated: "Consecutive terms 
of probation may, in situations such as this one, allow a greater amount of restitution to be 
paid, at the same time facilitating rehabilitation." In so stating, the court noted that 
"[cjommon sense leads us to believe, and clinical research appears to confirm that 
probationers pay their restitution obligations more diligently when under the threat of 
probation revocation." Id. at 555. 
Finally, defendant's claim fails because it is based on the erroneous premise that 
probation serves only the goal of rehabilitation. See Aplt. Br. at 24 ("Thus, UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i), violates substantive due process because it does not rationally 
further the Legislature's stated legitimate interest in rehabilitating offenders."). This Court 
has recognized otherwise: "In the rehabilitative sense, 'restitution is ordered only as it is 
relevant in correcting defendant's behavior and as a step to accomplishing traditional 
purposes of punishment, and is in fact considered to be a form of punishment.'" State v. 
Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted), cert, denied 853 P.2d 897 
(Utah 1993). In sum, the statutory authorization to impose an extended period of probation 
is rationally related to the express legislative object that defendants pay full restitution. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the trial 
court's sentencing defendant to three consecutive 36-month terms of probation. 
Respectfully submitted this ?~ day of July, 2007. 
M A R K L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
A m e n d m e n t X I V . Citizenship; privileges and immunities; due process; 
equal protection; apportionment of representation; disqualification of 
officers; public debt; enforcement 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
S e c 7. t D u e process of law] 
>jo person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 7 7 - 1 8 - 1 . Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation— 
Supervision—Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality— 
Terms and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or exten-
sion—Hearings—Electronic monitoring 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of 
any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the 
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court 
may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections 
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private 
organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the 
sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investiga-
tion standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards 
shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level 
of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to 
the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis 
for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to 
implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modi-
fications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other 
criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence 
for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence 
investigation report from the department or information from other sources 
about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the 
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement 
of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the depart-
ment regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by %court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to 
the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the 
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. 
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have 
not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall 
be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an 
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report 
with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be 
resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on 
the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investiga-
tion report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be 
waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present con-
cerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the 
defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may 
require that the defendant:. 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail 
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation by 
the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of 
electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including 
the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest 
in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; 
and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appro-
priate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation 
diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's 
own expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certifi-
cate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as 
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under 
Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with 
Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance 
with Subsection (10). 
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or 
class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemean-
ors or infractions. 
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under 
Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account 
receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdic-
tion of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the 
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the 
registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and 
immediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of 
State Debt Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, 
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to 
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of 
court. 
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State 
Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all 
cases when termination of supervised probation will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and com-
plete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(ll)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke 
probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term 
unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the 
hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is'tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and condi-
tions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant 
by the court. 
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a 
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a 
finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts assert-
ed to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that 
authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable 
cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is 
justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be 
served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit 
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, 
modified, or extended. 
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the 
hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be 
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for 
him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of 
the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecut-
ing attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning 
by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of proba-
tion, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or 
that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the "defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah 
State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the 
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the 
court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the 
state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priori-
ty for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic eval-
uations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Gov-
ernment Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the 
subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that 
the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to state-
ments or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the crime 
including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime on the 
victim or the victim's household. 
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of proba-
tion under the supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 
76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to 
the department in accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of 
electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order of the 
court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropri-
ate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which 
require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of. the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, 
it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Depart-
ment of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the 
defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of 
the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confine-
ment to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be 
indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this 
section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 2; Laws 1982, c. 9, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 47, 
§ 1; Laws 1983, c. 68, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 85, § 2; Laws 1984, c. 20, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 
212, § 17; Laws 1985, c. 229, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 114, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 226, § 1; 
Laws 1990, c. 134, § 2; Laws 1991, c. 66, § 5; Laws 1991, c. 206, § 6; Laws 1992, c. 
14, § 3; Laws 1993, c. 82, § 7; Laws 1993, c. 220, § 3; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 24; Laws 
1994, c. 198, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 230, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 20, § 146, eff. May 1, 1995; 
Laws 1995, c. 117, § 2, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 184, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 
1995, c. 301, § 3, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 337, § 11, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 
1995, c. 352, § 6, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 103, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 
1997, c. 390, § 2, eff. May 5,/1997; Laws 1998, c. 94, § 10, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 
1999, c. 279, § 8, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 287, § 7, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 
2001, c. 137, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 7, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 
2002, 5th Sp. Sess., c. 8, § 137, eff. Sept. 8, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 290, § 3, eff. May 5, 
2003. 
§ 7 7 - 2 7 - 1 . Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Board" means the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(2) "Commission" means the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
(3) "Commutation" is the change from a greater to a lesser punishment after 
conviction. 
(4) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(5) "Expiration" occurs when the maximum sentence has run. 
(6) "Family" means persons related to the victim as a spouse, child, sibling, 
parent, or grandparent, or the victim's legal guardian.% 
(7) "Panel" means members of the board assigned by the chairperson to a 
particular case. 
(8) "Pardon" is an act of grace by an appropriate authority exempting a 
person from punishment for a crime. 
(9) "Parole" is a release from imprisonment on prescribed conditions which, 
if satisfactorily performed by the parolee, enables the parolee to obtain a 
termination of his sentence. 
(10) "Probation" is an act of grace by the court suspending the imposition or 
execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions. 
(11) "Reprieve or respite" is the temporary suspension of the execution of 
the sentence. 
(12) "Termination" is the act of an appropriate authority discharging from 
parole or concluding the sentence of imprisonment prior to the expiration of 
the sentence. 
(13) "Victim" means: 
(a) a person against whom the defendant committed a felony or class A 
misdemeanor offense, and regarding which offense a hearing is held under 
this chapter; or 
(b) the victim's family, if the victim is deceased as a result of the offense for 
which a hearing is held under this chapter. 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1985, c. 198, § 6; Laws 1988, c. 172, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 
195, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 31; Laws 1996, c. 100, § 3, eff. April 29, 1996. 
As used m tms cnapter: 
(1) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest. 
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is con-
victed or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsi-
bility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the 
criminal conduct. 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction 
on the condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation 
program, make restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition. 
!
 (5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a 
prosecution. 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general dam-
ages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities 
and includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or 
otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical expenses. 
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution 
and defendant setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal 
charges upon which the defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the 
prosecution and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from 
the defendant but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction against him 
nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that he comply with specific 
conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between 
the prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and condi-
tions upon which, following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea 
may be held in abeyance. 
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prose-
cution and defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance 
agreement, or any agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any 
other iurisdiction or where charges are dismissed without a plea. 
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest 
from the time of sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a 
reward, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or 
transportation and as may be further defined by law. 
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money: 
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and convic-
tion of an offender; and 
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this informa-
tion, except that the person receiving the payment may not be a codefen-
dant, an accomplice, or a bounty hunter. 
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum 
offered to the public. 
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to 
terminate investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a 
prosecution that has been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted. 
(14)(a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities, 
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
§ 7 7 - 3 8 a - 2 0 2 . Restitution determination—Prosecution duties and respon-
sibilities 
(1) At the time of entry of a conviction or entry of any plea disposition of a 
felony or class A misdemeanor, the attorney general, county attorney, munici-
pal attorney, or district attorney shall provide to the d^c+r^^ ™urt: 
(a) the names of all victims, including third parties, asserting claims for 
restitution; 
(b) the actual or estimated amount of restitution determined at that time; 
and 
(c) whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay tne restitution specified 
as part of the plea disposition. 
(2) In computing actual or estimated restitution, the attorney general, county 
attorney, municipal attorney, or district attorney shall: 
(a) use the criteria set forth in Section 77-38a-302 for establishing restitu, 
tion amounts; and 
(b) in cases involving multiple victims, incorporate into any conviction or 
plea disposition all claims for restitution arising out of the investigation for 
which the defendant is charged. 
(3) If charges are not to be prosecuted as part of a plea disposition, restitu-
tion claims from victims of those crimes shall also be provided to the court. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 5, eff. April 30, 2001. 
§ 77-38a-3Q2. Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided 
in this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a1 plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim 
has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(13) and in determining 
whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and 
procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution 
and court-ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a 
victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having 
criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal 
sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined 
as provided in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate 
under this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the 
court record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full 
hearing on the issue. 
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing 
court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of-an 
offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of 
criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's 
criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or 
loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and 
devices relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical 
care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing 
recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense 
resulted in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are 
lost due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that 
were owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's current 
employment at the time of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections 
(5)(a) and (b) and:
 t 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment 
of ^restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the 
defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis 
or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitu-
tion and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order 
of restitution if the court determines that the complication and prolongation 
of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of restitution 
under this Subsection (5), substantially outweighs the need to provide restitu-
tion to the victim. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 8, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 13, eff. May 6, 2002; 
Laws 2002, c. 185, § 51, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 285, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003. 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
RULE 22. SENTENCE, JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity 
to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punish-
ment^ or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The 
prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any informa-
tion material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be 
issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and 
the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with 
the court. 
1
 (e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose 
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court 
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department or 
Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court 
shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
[Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.] 
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1 sorry about that or not. I just decided to stay, and here we are 
2 now. 
3 THE COURT: Did you get a paycheck the whole time you 
4 were working? 
5 MR. CANDEDO: No, actually the last four months I 
6 didn't. 
7 MR. BUGDEN: Were you ever paid a commission or bonuses? 
8 MR. CANDEDO: No, I was not. 
9 MR. BUGDEN: You were just salary? 
10 MR. CANDEDO: I was salary. 
11 THE COURT: What was your salary? 
12 MR. CANDEDO: It ended being 6500 a month, which is 
13 about -- a little bit more than I was making in Mexico before I 
14 moved here. In Mexico I was making $5,000 a month. I was a 
15 sales manager for a company (inaudible) over there. 
16 MR. BUGDEN: I think that's what we have to say. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I have reviewed a great 
18 deal of information on this, and I do not believe that Mr. 
19 Candedo had the same level of responsibility as Ms. Cano, 
20 although he has responsibility. 
21 What I think is the most fair thing to do with him is to 
22 have him serve some time, and then to work for a long time paying 
23 as much money back as humanly possible. 
2 4 I'm going to sentence him to one to five on the 
25 securities fraud — one to fifteen, excuse me, and zero to five 
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1 I on the sales by an unlicensed broker and employing an unlicensed 
2 broker -- concurrent sentences. 
3 I'm going to suspend — I'm also going to fine him 
4 $10,000 plus surcharge. I'm going to suspend the prison and the 
5 fine. I'm going to order him to serve 365 days in Salt Lake 
6 County jail and no credit for good time, no — he could be 
7 eligible for work release or ankle monitor, depending on the 
8 jail's standards for that. 
9 He is ordered to pay full restitution jointly and 
10 severally. I'm going to give the State 180 days to reach an 
11 agreement on the amount of restitution or to request a hearing 
12 where we will determine the amount of restitution. 
13 Surrender the passports. All the normal conditions of 
14 probation, which will be for 108 months. That's 36 months on 
15 each of the counts. That's nine years because of the amount of 
16 money that you've got to pay back. 
17 No contact with Ms. Cano or any other defendant in this 
18 case. Any questions? 
19 MR. BUGDEN: Your Honor, may I just politely inquire, do 
2 0 you have a power to — 
21 THE COURT: I can give 36 months on each of three 
22 felonies that he's convicted of. 
2 3 MR. BUGDEN: Okay. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
25 (Hearing concluded) 
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Prosecutor: BARLOW, CHARLENE 
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DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 3, 1971 
Audio 
Tape Number: 22 Tape Count: 1100 
CHARGES 
SECURITIES FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/31/2005 Guilty 
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/31/2005 Guilty 
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/31/2005 Guilty 
HEARING 
TAPE: 22 COUNT: 1100 








uase JMO: uj±yuu4uu 
Date: Sep 12, 2005 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES 
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES 
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Prison terms are concurrent with each other. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 3 65 day(s) 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
No credit for good time. 
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Case No: 031900400 
Date: Sep 12, 2005 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $10000.00 
Charge # 2 
Charge # 3 
Total Fine: $10000.00 
Total Suspended: $10000.00 
Total Surcharge: $0 
Total Principal Due: $0 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 108 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
Defendant is sentenced to 36 months on each count. 
Defendant is to pay full restitution jointly and serverally. An 
amount if agreed upon is to be filed with the court within 180 days 
or a hearing will be set. 
Defendant to pay a fine and surcharge of $10,000 which is 
suspended. 
Defendant is to serve 3 65 days jail with no credit for good time. 
Defendant is to surrender passport. 
Dated this V^ day of J<£p&~< , 2 0#-gT~. 
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